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Abstract: Treves et al.’s proposal is welcome, but it will have to face at least four challenges: the
interconnectedness of the human and the nonhuman portions of the biosphere, conflicts of
interest, human overpopulation, and capitalism itself.
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Treves et al.'s (2019) proposal has great merit, arguing as it does for a shift in current processes
of decision making on the future of the planet — which are at present generally confined to adult
humans with various vested interests — to include representation for nonhuman "selves", both
as individuals and groups, and for young and future generation humans. They propose advocacy
through a court system in which qualified "trustees" represent those who cannot represent
themselves.
These suggestions thus entail radical rethinking of the popularly accepted Cartesian divide,
and a reconstitution of the nature of "selves" entitled to rights under existing or future
constitutional laws. In addition to the proposed changes in philosophy as well as legal and
constitutional practices, I would suggest that further consideration needs to be given to the
following.
1. Connectedness. The issue of connection — even the almost indispensable continuity of
various selves — is implicit in Treves et al.’s proposal. In the case of humans and nonhumans, this
probably needs more emphasis. Although nonhuman selves are perforce dependent on us, we
humans are in many emotional, philosophical and material ways also dependent on them. Such
continuity is stressed in studies of trophic cascades (e.g., Wohlleben (2017) as well as in all
ecosystem studies. But human dependence on the nononhuman (or "extra-human”: I prefer
Plumwood's terminology) needs more consideration.
2. Conflicts of Interest. Treves et al. refer to "confusion" between the positions of
advocates of wellbeing or rights for individual nonhumans, and the customary conservationist
stance of an exclusionary prioritisation of groups or species. This, however, is less a confusion
than an outright conflict — a stressful and complex issue for those who wish to effect a strategic
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alliance between the proponents of both (Sagoff, 1984). It has even generated virtually separate
disciplines. Mathews (2012) points out that not only is this a conflict of philosophical positions: it
bedevils practice in relation to the nonhuman on a number of fronts. She also traces the very
different origins of the two positions. In treating this rift as confusion rather than conflict, Treves
et al. gloss over a fundamental challenge for both theory and practice without really addressing
it.
3. Population. Any future court arbitration attempting fair judgment for all stakeholders
would need to assume some degree of a level playing field — or at least a field on which to play.
But "habitat loss" already irretrievably incurred by nonhumans (and some humans as well)
precludes a plethora of future possibilities. “Habitat loss” is a convenient passive euphemism for
human annihilation, decimation, displacement and destruction of individual and group selves.
This accelerating habitat loss can be addressed only through an open discussion and confrontation
of the pandemic problem of human overpopulation. (Whereas human growth rates are declining
in some countries, overall population numbers are not.) Once sentient selves, both human and
nonhuman are present on the planet, their wellbeing and rights must be respected and attended
to. The right to reproduce as much as they choose, however, is apparently unassailable and
inalienable for all humans (though not nonhumans). This fraught subject must be broached if the
planet is to offer any future at all for nonhumans (and, by continuity, to humans themselves).
4. Capitalism. Treves et al. do acknowledge the difficulty of challenging powerful capitalist
interests in changing the very concept of "who counts” and implementing legislation to arbitrate
competing positions. They do not see this as insurmountable, however, citing the abolition of the
slave trade. It is certainly true that Europe's financial wealth was, for almost two centuries, heavily
dependent on that trade. But its eventual abolition did not threaten capitalism itself, nor did it
challenge the icons of "progress" and "development" — as the proposals of Treves et al. assuredly
would. Capitalism, land grabbing, and wealth accumulation as the be-all and end-all of current
human societies and individuals is no longer simply the province of the West: it is the goal of an
expanding China, as well as of the many world communities that are still or increasingly under
Western or Chinese influence.
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PhD Scholarship in Foundations of Animal Sentience (ASENT)
London School of Economics
The Foundations of Animal Sentience project (ASENT), a five-year ERC-funded project led by
Dr. Jonathan Birch, aims to study the methodological foundations of animal sentience research
and the link between sentience and animal welfare. The project seeks to recruit one PhD student.
The student will contribute to the project either by exploring the methodological foundations of
animal sentience research, or by investigating the pathway from animal sentience research to
consequences for animal welfare legislation and policy and/or animal ethics.
The student, at the time of starting the PhD, should have an excellent undergraduate degree and a
completed Masters degree in philosophy or another relevant subject, such as comparative
psychology, cognitive science, or animal welfare science. The primary supervisor of the PhD
project will be Dr. Jonathan Birch. If you have any questions or want to know more about the
project, please write to Jonathan at j.birch2@lse.ac.uk.
The successful applicant will receive full funding for a 4-year PhD at the LSE, including full
payment of tuition fees AND a maintenance stipend of £18,000 per annum. To apply, please
apply to the MPhil/PhD in Philosophy at the LSE in the usual way, carefully following all the
requirements described on the LSE’s website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-atlse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2020/MPhilPhD-Philosophy. When you apply, please indicate
clearly in your application (in both your Statement of Academic Purpose AND your Research
Proposal) that you wish to be considered for the ASENT scholarship.
You should include, in your research proposal, a substantial description (of at least 1,500
words) of a research project relevant to ASENT. You MAY, if you wish, include TWO
research proposals in the same document: a proposal relevant to ASENT, and a proposal on a
different subject that you would pursue if awarded an LSE Studentship or a LAHP (AHRC)
scholarship. If you do this, please indicate clearly which of the two proposals is relevant to
ASENT.
CLOSING DATE: 24 JANUARY 2020.
It is expected that interviews will be conducted in late January or in February.
www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/asent-scholarship/
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